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Abstract
We show that regulators’ price-setting, rate base, and allowed rate of return decisions are
inextricably linked. Once regulators switch from traditional rate of return regulation, the
irreversibility of much infrastructure investment significantly alters the results of the usual
approach to price-setting, as exemplified by Marshall, Yawitz and Greenberg (1981). In
particular, the practice of ‘optimizing’ inefficient assets out of the regulated firm’s rate base,
as in total element long-run incremental cost (TELRIC) calculations in telecommunications,
exposes the firm to demand risk. The firm requires an economically-significant premium
for bearing this risk, and this premium is an increasing function of the unsystematic risk
of demand shocks. In addition, we argue that if the firm is to break even under incentive
regulation then the level of the rate base will not generally equal the optimized replacement
cost.
JEL Classification code: G31, L5
Keywords: Regulation, Cost of capital, Rate base, Sunk costs
1 Introduction
A regulator needs to make three decisions when setting the prices which a regulated utility
may charge. It needs to choose the appropriate cost of the firm’s assets (the rate base), the
rate of return the firm is allowed to earn on this rate base, and the prices the firm is allowed to
charge. Marshall, Yawitz and Greenberg (1981) show how the last two decisions are inter-related.
However, because they focus on traditional rate of return regulation, they do not discuss the
effect of the choice of rate base. Nor do they consider the implications of irreversible investment,
which characterizes most industries subject to price regulation.1 In this paper we show that the
choice of rate base can have a crucial impact on the other two decisions, and that the reason for
this is the irreversibility of investment. In particular, we demonstrate that the regulator’s choice
of rate base and the form of regulation have a profound effect on the risks which the regulated
firm faces, and thus on the rate of return it should be allowed to earn.
∗Corresponding author. Address: ISCR, PO Box 600, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New
Zealand. Ph: 64-4-4635562. Fax: 64-4-4635566. Email: lew.evans@vuw.ac.nz
1Irreversibility is a widespread phenomenon, even in industries where physical capital is not especially industry-
specific. For example, between 50 and 80 percent of the cost of machine tools in Sweden is sunk (Asplund, 2000),
and the market value of physical capital in the U.S. aerospace industry is just 28 percent of its replacement cost
on average (Ramey and Shapiro, 2001). Irreversibility is likely to be even greater in most infrastructure networks.
Hausman (1999) and Economides (1999) debate the extent of irreversibility in the context of telecommunications.
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There are two widely-applied rate bases. Traditional rate of return regulation uses the
depreciated historical installation cost of existing assets as the rate base. When combined with
forecast operating expenditure, this yields the revenue requirement that, along with forecast
demand, is used to set prices.2 The historical cost rate base continues to be used in some
situations: for example, for elements of the electricity transmission system in the U.S. Historical
cost rate of return regulation was widely used until the 1980s when it was gradually replaced
with incentive regulation, where prices are set in ways that seek to mimic competitive markets.
There are two common approaches. In the first, RPI-X regulation, a price path is specified by
allowing a starting price to grow at the rate of inflation, adjusted for industry-specific factors
such as relative productivity growth and input price changes. We consider the second approach
to incentive regulation, in which prices are set using a rate base that is calculated at either
the optimized replacement cost (ORC) of the assets, or the optimized deprival value (ODV),
a closely related concept.3 Under the ORC rate base, the firm’s prices are set periodically
using the least cost bundle of assets required to service existing customers. The ODV of an
individual asset is typically calculated as the minimum of its replacement cost and the present
value of the maximum net revenue which the asset can generate.4 Newbery (1999, Chapter 7)
argues that in telecommunications, where ORC is the total element long-run incremental cost
(TELRIC) of a service, use of an ORC rate base will yield price paths that approximate, as well
as is possible, those of competitive markets. In the TELRIC calculation, costs are based on the
elements of the system needed to provide the service, including the total attributable costs of
that element calculated as the incremental cost required to produce an extra unit of that service
over the long run (where all elements of the system can be varied). The TELRIC approach in
telecommunications has been applied widely in the U.K. and the U.S., and is recommended by
the European Commission (Newbery, 1999, p. 339).
The revenue which the regulated firm requires if it is to break even equals the sum of two
components: expected economic depreciation and a reasonable rate of return earned on the rate
base.5 We show that if the regulator imposes a historical cost rate base, then the only risk
which the firm must bear is the risk that demand and operating cost experience shocks after
the price-setting process is complete (and before prices are reset in the future). If, instead, the
regulator adopts a replacement cost rate base, then the firm is also exposed to the risk of capital
price shocks on its existing assets. The addition of the optimized rate base adds demand shocks
at the time prices are reset to the list of risks faced by the regulated firm. Since fluctuations in
demand affect the capacity of the (hypothetical) assets on which the optimization calculation is
based, they affect the rate base. That is, when the regulator chooses ORC or ODV as the firm’s
rate base, the firm is exposed to the risk of future capital price and demand shocks at the time
prices are reset.
Despite the fact that our analysis is performed with the CAPM as our valuation model,
the irreversible nature of the investment we consider means that unsystematic demand risk,
as well as its systematic counterpart, affects the required rate of return when the rate base
is subject to optimization. In fact, greater unsystematic risk compounds the impact of the
systematic component of demand risk. For example, the firm’s ORC falls if demand falls, since
falling demand means that even more units of capacity are under-utilized. In contrast, rising
demand only raises replacement cost to the point where all existing assets are fully utilized;
larger increases have no further impact. This asymmetry means that increased unsystematic
demand risk, which (by definition) has no effect on the covariance of demand with market
2Typically, approved investment plans also affect the revenue requirement under rate of return regulation. For
a discussion of the process of rate of return regulation see Spulber (1989, pp. 270–279).
3Our analysis of this form of incentive regulation has direct implications for settings under RPI-X regulation.
4See Clarke (1998) for the application of the optimized deprival value concept in Australia and New Zealand.
5We ignore any timing options which the regulated firm might have (in fact, we assume them away), as well
as any capital market frictions which the firm might face. Both of these would be expected to further raise the
allowed rate of return for the regulated firm.
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returns, increases the covariance between the firm’s ORC and market returns. This, in turn,
raises the systematic risk of the firm’s cash flows. Using simulations, we show that the effect on
the firm’s allowed rate of return is economically significant for reasonable parameter values.
Drawing on the analysis of TELRIC of Mandy and Sharkey (2003), Littlechild (2003) argues
that optimized replacement cost regulation shifts the risk of forecast errors to the regulated firm
and raises its cost of capital because it is impossible to predict with accuracy the future path
of cost, technology, and demand.6 He goes on to say that acceptance of this risk by the firm
may improve the prospects of competition because prices are much more stable where the firm
takes on the regulatory-price setting risk. Hausmann (1997) uses the option to invest to argue
that the use of TELRIC to price elements of a network underprices the economic cost of the
services provided and will adversely affect investment. Jorde, Sidak, and Teece (2000) argue
that the common practice of using TELRIC in pricing elements of telecommunications networks
that are unbundled by mandate raises the cost of equity of firms that own the networks, and
consequently reduces investment in these networks. Ingraham and Sidak (2003) find that for
their sample of firms the cost of equity is indeed raised by mandatory unbundling, particularly
in recession periods. This is a prediction of our model where equipment prices are less sensitive
than demand to recessions.
Rate of return regulation is most plausible where entry is prevented and technologies are
changing slowly, whereas incentive regulation more readily allows price regulation to co-exist
with some entry and decentralized decisions about investment. Recently, incentive regulation
has been preferred over rate of return regulation because it de-links, to an extent that depends
on the particulars of the regime, firm-specific costs and profits from prices and thereby provides
incentives for firms to behave efficiently.7 The widespread adoption of incentive regulation
renders it extremely important that its implementation does actually promote efficiency over
other forms of regulation. The effect on investment is particularly important through its effect
on dynamic efficiency, and the number of works that examine the implementation of incentive
regulation in this context is growing.8 Our model addresses the dynamic efficiency over time
issue discussed by Littlechild (2003, pp. 304–306). We show that if the firm is forced to supply
and is expected to break-even on new investment, then the rate base should equal the ORC of
fully utilized assets plus an amount representing the present value of the expected future cost
savings resulting from the availability of any excess capacity at the time prices are (re)set.9
In the next section we outline the various regulatory possibilities we consider. Section 3
develops the analysis of Marshall et al. (1981) for irreversibility and applies it to the different
regulatory regimes. We examine what our results mean for regulatory policy in Section 4,
where we present some numerical measures of the implications of our analysis. We conclude in
Section 5.
2 The model
We consider a regulated firm which faces uncertain future demand and uncertain future capital
prices. In year t the capacity of the firm’s assets equals St. Each new unit of capacity built
by the firm in year t costs Pt. Investment in capacity is irreversible and the firm’s assets are
infinitely-lived. The firm requires an asset with capacity Xt to meet the needs of all its potential
6Mandy and Sharkey (2003) explain the effect on cost recovery of the regulated firm when prices are set on
the basis of TELRIC at shorter intervals than asset lives in a world of certainty.
7The distinction between rate of return and incentive regulation and the critical issues relating to incentive
regulation are pointed out by Newbery (1999, Chapter 2) and Laffont and Tirole (1993, Chapters 1 and 2).
8Baumol (2002) argues that investment yielding dynamic efficiency is the dominant factor affecting economic
welfare.
9Evans and Guthrie (2003) show that irreversibility and the requirement to supply imply that incentive regu-
lation is efficient relative to rate of return regulation.
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customers. It has total revenue and operating cost in year t of Rt and Ct respectively.
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The firm is regulated, and this regulation takes two forms. Firstly, the firm is required to
meet the demand of all customers who wish to trade with the firm; that is, its capacity must
satisfy St ≥ Xt at all times. We call this a universal service obligation. Secondly, the regulator
restricts the firm’s output price. The precise form of this restriction is not specified — for
example, the regulator might set the firm’s output prices, or it might impose a cap which the
firm cannot breach. The important thing is that the regulator is able to control the year-ahead
expected revenue; that is, in year t the regulator controls Et[Rt+1].
11
We assume that the firm has no flexibility in the timing of its investment — in particular,
it does not invest in capacity which is not needed to meet demand. In practice, the uncertainty
surrounding future capital prices means that there may be instances in which the firm would
choose to build excess capacity, such as when capital prices are expected to rise in the future.
However, we eliminate such flexibility for several reasons. First, this assumption means that
excess capacity really is “excess” — that is, if a hypothetical firm invested in assets to replace
the regulated firm, it would not build the excess capacity. Second, there has been vigorous
debate about the effect of investment flexibility (and other real options) on the revenue which
regulated firms should be allowed to collect, with some authors arguing that a ‘real option’
premium should be added to the weighted-average cost of capital when calculating such firms’
costs of capital. In this paper we show that some sort of premium is appropriate even when
the regulated firm has no real options. Last, and by no means least, this assumption keeps the
model tractable.
The combination of irreversibility, the universal service obligation imposed on the firm, and
its lack of investment timing flexibility has important implications for investment behavior. If
the firm has capacity St ≥ Xt in year t, it will only have to invest in year t+ 1 if Xt+1 > St, in
which case investment expenditure equals It+1 = Pt+1(Xt+1 − St) and the assets’ capacity will
rise to St+1 = Xt+1. If Xt+1 ≤ St, then the firm’s investment is zero and the capacity of its
assets remains at St+1 = St. Thus, the capacity of its assets in year t+ i will equal
St+i = max{St, Xt+1, Xt+2, . . . , Xt+i}
and investment expenditure in that year will be
It+i = Pt+imax{Xt+i −max{St, Xt+1, Xt+2, . . . , Xt+i−1}, 0}.
Regardless of the future path of demand, investment in each future year is a non-increasing
function of current capacity.
Although a firm building a network from scratch in year t would not build any excess capacity,
it does not follow that excess capacity held by an existing firm has no value. In fact, if the
regulated firm has excess capacity in year t, its future investment expenditure will sometimes be
lower, and will never be greater, than that of a firm which starts business in year t. The latter
firm incurs investment expenditure of
I
(t)
t+i = Pt+imax{Xt+i −max{Xt, Xt+1, . . . , Xt+i−1}, 0}
in year t+ i, so that the regulated firm’s excess capacity reduces its investment expenditure in
year t+ i by the amount
I
(t)
t+i − It+i = Pt+imax{Xt+i −max{Xt, Xt+1, . . . , Xt+i−1}, 0}
− Pt+imax{Xt+i −max{St, Xt+1, . . . , Xt+i−1}, 0}.
10We are keeping our model deliberately abstract in order to illustrate the importance of irreversibility, and
not the particular industry, on regulation. In particular, the precise interpretation of capacity will vary with the
industry considered. For a telecommunications firm, capacity might represent the number of connections to the
network. For an electricity distribution network, capacity might reflect the peak load carried over the network.
11We assume the regulator resets prices annually. Although the calculations would become more complicated,
and the expressions for expected revenue and the allowed rates of return would change, we could relax this
assumption without changing our main results.
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This is zero if Xt+i ≤ max{Xt, Xt+1, . . . , Xt+i−1} and positive otherwise. The value of the
regulated firm’s excess capacity is the market value of this stream of future cash flows. We will
see that successful implementation of incentive regulation requires an understanding of the value
excess capacity can generate.
The market value of the regulated firm equals the market value of the net cash flows received
by the firm’s owners. These depend, in part, on the revenue which the regulator allows the firm
to collect from its customers. Allowed revenue typically includes compensation for the firm’s
investment in physical capital, and this generally takes the form of the product of the “value” of
the firm’s assets and some regulated rate of return. Clearly this value cannot equal the market
value of the regulated firm, as then a circularity results: the firm’s market value depends on its
allowed revenue, which depends on its market value. What is needed is some exogenous measure
of the value of the firm’s assets, known as the firm’s rate base. Several possibilities have been
suggested.12
Historical cost (HC). From year t− 1 to year t, the firm invests It in new assets. Thus, the
historical cost of the firm’s assets evolves according to HCt = HCt−1 + It.
Replacement cost (RC). In year t, if the firm was to replace its assets it would have to acquire
St units of capacity at a price of Pt. Thus, replacement cost in year t is RCt = PtSt.
Optimized replacement cost (ORC). If the firm was to replace its assets in year t with an
optimal configuration, it would have to acquire min{St, Xt} units of capacity at a price of
Pt, since only Xt units would be required if there was excess capacity, while all St would
have to be replaced if there was no excess capacity. Therefore, optimized replacement cost
in year t is ORCt = Ptmin{St, Xt}.
Optimized deprival value (ODV). This asset value measures the reduction in the value of
the firm if it was deprived of ownership of the assets.13 The impact of such an event
depends on whether or not the assets are currently being used to full capacity. If the firm
is currently operating at full capacity, it would immediately rebuild St units of capacity if
it lost ownership of its assets, and future investment expenditures would be unaffected by
the loss. Thus, losing ownership of the assets would cost the firm ODVt = PtSt. On the
other hand, if the firm currently has excess capacity, then it would immediately rebuild
just Xt units of capacity, costing PtXt, if it lost ownership of its assets. However, future
investment expenditure would rise by Iˆ
(t)
t+i−It+i ≥ 0 in year t+ i for all i ≥ 1. Thus, losing
ownership of the assets would cost the firm
ODVt = PtXt + U
(t)
t −Mt,
where U
(t)
t denotes the value in year t of all future investment expenditure, from year t+1
onwards, of a network built in year t, and Mt denotes the value in year t of all of the
firm’s future investment expenditure, from year t + 1 onwards. This is the sum of the
optimized replacement cost of the firm’s assets and the value of the firm’s excess capacity.
Combining these two cases, we see that the optimized deprival value of the firm’s assets is
ODVt = ORCt + (value of excess capacity at t).
12Our assumption that the firm’s assets have infinite lives means that the issue of physical depreciation does not
arise. The following definitions of rate bases need to be modified when assets have finite physical lives. To keep
the analysis as simple as possible, we do not consider physical depreciation, focussing instead on the consequences
of irreversibility and uncertainty.
13Regulators in some jurisdictions use a valuation methodology which they term ‘optimized deprival value’.
However, as we explain in Section 4.1, their approach has more in common with ORC than with our ODV
concept.
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We now turn to the problem of determining a “reasonable” level of revenue which the regu-
lated firm should be allowed to earn. We will see that the solution depends on the chosen rate
base.
3 The approach of Marshall, et al.
In our model the regulator sets prices (or, at least, sets parameters which influence the prices
which the regulated firm can set) in order that the regulated firm can achieve some desired level
of revenue. This level of revenue must be sufficient to compensate the firm for the costs which it
incurs, comprising operating costs and the cost of capital. The regulator determines the firm’s
cost of capital by specifying the rate base (essentially the ‘cost’ of the firm’s assets) as well as
the rate of return which the firm is allowed to earn on this rate base. Thus, the regulator must
make three decisions: (1) What is the appropriate cost of the firm’s assets? (2) What rate of
return is the firm allowed to earn on this rate base? (3) What set of prices is the firm allowed
to charge?
Marshall, et al. (1981) point out that the prices set by a regulator affect the risk borne by
the firm, and therefore the rate of return which the firm should be allowed to earn on its rate
base. In particular, the three questions above cannot be considered separately. Marshall, et al.
use the CAPM to integrate the rate of return determination and price setting decisions (but do
not consider the choice of rate base). They argue that the regulator should set output prices
in such a way that the market value of the firm equals the cost of the firm’s assets. In this
section we describe how Marshall, et al.’s approach would be implemented for the types of firms
we consider in this paper, firstly for an arbitrary choice of rate base, and then for the four rate
bases described in Section 2.
If the market value of the firm is Ft+1 at the end of year t + 1, then the value of investors’
stake in the firm at the start of year t+ 1 is
Vt+1 = Rt+1 − Ct+1 − It+1 + Ft+1.
From the certainty equivalent form of the CAPM, the value of their stake in year t is
Ft =
Et[Vt+1]− λtCovt[Vt+1, rm,t]
1 + rf,t
,
where λt = (Et[rm,t]−rf,t)/Vart[rm,t] is the market price of risk, rf,t is the risk-free interest rate
over the year [t, t + 1], and rm,t is the (risky) rate of return on the market portfolio over the
same period. The regulator’s objective is to set prices such that the market value of the firm is
always equal to some exogenous rate base. For the rate base Bt, this can be achieved provided
that14
Bt =
Et[Rt+1 − Ct+1 − It+1 +Bt+1]− λtCovt[Rt+1 − Ct+1 − It+1 +Bt+1, rm,t]
1 + rf,t
. (1)
Solving for Et[Rt+1] shows that expected revenue must equal
Et[Rt+1] = (1 + rf,t)Bt + λtCovt[Rt+1 − Ct+1 − It+1 +Bt+1, rm,t] (2)
+ Et[Ct+1] + Et[It+1]− Et[Bt+1].
By choosing the prices which the firm is allowed to charge, the regulator effectively chooses
the distribution from which revenue Rt+1 will be drawn. We will not consider the price-setting
decision explicitly, but rather assume that the resulting distribution of revenue is consistent with
equation (2).
14The appearance of investment expenditure in equation (1) ensures that the firm will always be able to attract
capital when investment is required.
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It is convenient to rewrite (2) in the form
Et[Rt+1] = Et[Ct+1] + rtBt + (Bt + Et[It+1]− Et[Bt+1]) (3)
and
rt = rf,t + λtCovt
[
Rt+1 − Ct+1 − It+1 +Bt+1
Bt
, rm,t
]
. (4)
Equation (4) gives the rate of return, rt, which the firm is allowed to earn on its rate base.
Marshall, et al.’s observation, that the regulator’s choice of prices affects rt, is illustrated by the
appearance of Rt+1 in the right hand side of (4). The expected revenue given by equation (3)
can be naturally decomposed into three terms:
Operating cost. At the end of the year the firm expects to incur operating costs of Et[Ct+1].
Return on capital. The second term, rtBt, equals the amount which the firm’s investors are
allowed to earn on the rate base. From (4), the allowed rate of return is the sum of the
risk free interest rate and a risk premium which compensates investors for the systematic
risk of shocks to the future value of their stake in the firm.
Return of capital. In year t, the value of the firm equals Bt. After one year, this changes
to Bt+1. However, in the meantime the firm’s investors have invested a further It+1.
Provided investment raises the rate base dollar-for-dollar, then the market value of their
year t investment equals B′t+1 = Bt+1 − It+1 in year t + 1. Thus the term Et[Bt − B
′
t+1]
can be interpreted as the expected reduction in value of the investors’ asset.
Especially in the case of infrastructure assets, the level of the rate base and the allowed rate of
return on the rate base are crucial determinants of the regulated firm’s allowed revenue.
We now consider four possible implementations of this approach which differ in their choice
of rate base.
3.1 Historical cost
Under traditional rate of return regulation, the rate base rises each year by the amount of
investment made by the regulated firm. That is, if the rate base in year t equals Bt, then the
rate base in year t + 1 equals Bt+1 = Bt + It+1, the historical cost of the firm’s assets. From
equation (3), the firm’s expected revenue equals
Et[Rt+1] = Et[Ct+1] + rtBt.
The firm does not receive any compensation for expected economic depreciation because no such
depreciation can occur. From equation (4), the appropriate risk-adjusted discount rate is
rt = rf,t + λtCovt
[
Rt+1 − Ct+1
Bt
, rm,t
]
,
since the only risk the firm is exposed to is that shocks to revenue and operating costs might
occur after the regulator sets prices (and before it resets them in year t+ 1).
3.2 Replacement cost
When the replacement cost of the firm’s assets is chosen as the rate base, substituting Bt = PtSt,
Bt+1 = Pt+1St+1, and It+1 = Pt+1(St+1 − St) into equations (3) and (4) shows that the firm’s
expected revenue must equal
Et[Rt+1] = Et[Ct+1] + rtBt + (Pt − Et[Pt+1])St (5)
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and the allowed rate of return must be
rt = rf,t + λtCovt
[
Rt+1 − Ct+1
Bt
+
Pt+1
Pt
, rm,t
]
. (6)
Compared to the case of an historical cost rate base, additional terms, reflecting the possibility
of fluctuations in capital prices, appear in both the allowed revenue and the allowed rate of
return. The new component of the firm’s allowed revenue, (Pt−Et[Pt+1])St, adjusts for expected
economic depreciation — that is, the firm is allowed to collect just enough additional revenue
to compensate it for any expected decline in the level of its rate base. The new component in
the firm’s allowed rate of return,
λtCovt
[
Pt+1
Pt
, rm,t
]
,
compensates the firm for the systematic risk of shocks to capital prices (and hence to the firm’s
rate base).
3.3 Optimized replacement cost
The regulated firm is exposed to additional risk when the optimized replacement cost of its
assets is chosen as the rate base. To see why, note that after any required investment has
occurred in year t the capacity of the firm’s assets satisfies St ≥ Xt, so that the ORC of
its assets is Bt = PtXt. If demand in year t + 1 satisfies Xt+1 ≤ St, then no investment is
necessary; It+1 = 0, St+1 = St, and Bt+1 = Pt+1Xt+1. On the other hand, if demand satisfies
Xt+1 > St, then the firm will have to expand capacity; investment expenditure will equal
It+1 = Pt+1(Xt+1 − St), capacity will rise to St+1 = Xt+1, and the closing rate base will equal
Bt+1 = Pt+1Xt+1. Combining these two cases, we have that
Bt+1 − It+1 = Pt+1min{St, Xt+1}.
Substituting this value into equations (3) and (4) shows that the firm’s expected revenue must
equal15
Et[Rt+1] = Et[Ct+1] + rtBt +
(
PtXt − Et[Pt+1min{St, Xt+1}]
)
and its allowed rate of return is
rt = rf,t + λtCovt
[
Rt+1 − Ct+1
Bt
+
Pt+1
Pt
min
{
St
Xt
,
Xt+1
Xt
}
, rm,t
]
.
Compared to the case with simply a replacement cost rate base, now the distribution of future
demand Xt+1 affects both expected revenue and the allowed rate of return.
As was the case with a replacement cost rate base, the firm is exposed to the risk of capital
price shocks, but now it also faces demand risk: holding the capital price constant, if demand
rises then the value of the rate base increases, while if demand falls the value of the rate base falls.
However, the risk is asymmetric, since increases in demand beyond the assets’ current capacity
have no additional impact, while there is unlimited downside risk from negative demand shocks.
We will see in Section 4 that this asymmetry means that the total risk, and not just its systematic
component, affects both expected economic depreciation and the allowed rate of return.
The value of the firm in year t, PtXt, does not depend on the capacity of its assets. But
we know that having excess capacity reduces the future investment expenditure of the firm and,
15Notice that when investment is reversible, we obtain the same expressions for expected revenue and allowed
rate of return as in Section 3.2. The reason is that with reversible investment the firm will never carry excess
capacity, and St = Xt at all times. If demand rises from year t to year t + 1, the firm will have to invest
Pt+1(Xt+1 −Xt) in new capacity; if demand falls from year t to year t + 1, the firm will raise Pt+1(Xt −Xt+1)
from selling excess capacity. Overall, investment is It+1 = Pt+1(Xt+1 − Xt). Substituting these values into
equations (3) and (4), together with the new rate base Bt = PtXt, results in equations (5) and (6).
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holding all else equal, raises the value of the firm. Here, however, all else is not held equal — the
greater the firm’s excess capacity, the smaller its allowed revenue. In effect, the firm is punished
for having excess capacity. This is inconsistent with modern incentive regulation, which requires
that the firm’s allowed revenues depend only on the cost structure of an efficient alternative
provider. Thus incentive regulation is unable to drive the market value of the regulated firm to
the replacement cost of an efficiently-configured firm. We close this section by discussing one
choice of rate base which is consistent with incentive regulation.
3.4 Optimized deprival value
In the fourth and final possibility we consider, the regulated firm receives the level of revenue
that would be required for a hypothetical firm (which can invest in assets configured to meet
current and future demand) to replace the incumbent and just break even. If such a replacement
firm invests in year t and undertakes all future investment required to meet the universal service
obligation, then its net cash flow is −PtXt in year t, and Rt+i − Ct+i − Iˆ
(t)
t+i in year t + i for
all i ≥ 1. The regulator sets prices such that the market value of all cash flows from year
t+ 1 onwards equals PtXt, so that the hypothetical efficient replacement firm just breaks even.
Relative to this firm, the regulated firm receives cash flows of Iˆ
(t)
t+i − It+i in year t + i for all
i ≥ 1. Thus, the market value of the regulated firm exceeds the market value of the hypothetical
replacement firm, PtXt, by an amount equal to the market value of the stream of incremental
cash flows. It follows that the market value of the regulated firm equals the sum of PtXt, the
ORC of its assets, and the value of its excess capacity; that is, the market value of the regulated
firm equals the ODV of its assets.
Substituting the firm’s ODV as the rate base in equations (3) and (4) shows that expected
revenue equals
Et[Rt+1] = Et[Ct+1] + rtODVt + (ODVt + Et[It+1]− Et[ODVt+1]),
where the rate of return allowed on the ODV rate base equals
rt = rf,t + λtCovt
[
Rt+1 − Ct+1 − It+1 +ODVt+1
ODVt
, rm,t
]
.
Since the firm’s ODV depends on the actual capacity of its assets, and ODV appears in both
equations above, it might seem that the firm’s allowed revenue depends on this capacity. How-
ever, this is not the case — the firm’s expected revenue is independent of St.
Proof. Recall that Mt denotes the value in year t of all of the firm’s future investment expenditure,
from year t+ 1 onwards. Therefore Mt satisfies
Mt =
Et[It+1 +Mt+1]− λtCovt[It+1 +Mt+1, rm,t]
1 + rf,t
. (7)
Recall also that U
(t)
t denotes the value in year t of all future investment expenditure, from year t+1
onwards, of a replacement firm that started business in year t, so that
ODVt = PtXt + U
(t)
t −Mt.
Substituting this expression for the ODV asset base into equation (1) gives
PtXt + U
(t)
t −Mt =
Et[Rt+1 − Ct+1 − It+1 + Pt+1Xt+1 + U
(t+1)
t+1 −Mt+1]
1 + rf,t
−
λtCovt[Rt+1 − Ct+1 − It+1 + Pt+1Xt+1 + U
(t+1)
t+1 −Mt+1, rm,t]
1 + rf,t
.
Using equation (7) to eliminate Mt allows us to simplify this to
PtXt + U
(t)
t =
Et[Rt+1 − Ct+1 + Pt+1Xt+1 + U
(t+1)
t+1 ]
1 + rf,t
(8)
−
λtCovt[Rt+1 − Ct+1 + Pt+1Xt+1 + U
(t+1)
t+1 , rm,t]
1 + rf,t
.
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This equation does not depend on the capacity (St) of the firm’s assets, but rather on current (Xt)
and future (Xt+1) demand. ¥
Thus, when ODV is used as the rate base, Marshall, et al.’s approach results in a form of
incentive regulation.
If the firm’s allowed revenue does not depend on the capacity of its assets, then what does
it depend on? We find that the regulated firm’s allowed revenue is
Et[Rt+1] = Et[Ct+1] + rtPtXt +
(
PtXt − Et[Pt+1min{Xt, Xt+1}+ U
(t+1)
t+1 − U
(t)
t+1]
)
, (9)
where the allowed rate of return rt equals
rt = rf,t + λtCovt
[
Rt+1 − Ct+1
PtXt
+
Pt+1
Pt
min
{
1,
Xt+1
Xt
}
+
U
(t+1)
t+1 − U
(t)
t+1
PtXt
, rm,t
]
. (10)
Proof. In keeping with the definition of U
(t)
t in Section 2, we denote by U
(t)
t+i the market value,
measured in year t + i, of all investment expenditure from year t + i + 1 onwards of an efficient
hypothetical firm which replaced the regulated firm in year t. Therefore
U
(t)
t =
Et[Iˆ
(t)
t+1 + U
(t)
t+1]− λtCovt[Iˆ
(t)
t+1 + U
(t)
t+1, rm,t]
1 + rf,t
.
We use this to eliminate U
(t)
t from equation (8), obtaining
PtXt = −U
(t)
t +
Et[Rt+1 − Ct+1 + Pt+1Xt+1 + U
(t+1)
t+1 ]
1 + rf,t
−
λtCovt[Rt+1 − Ct+1 + Pt+1Xt+1 + U
(t+1)
t+1 , rm,t]
1 + rf,t
=
Et[Rt+1 − Ct+1 + Pt+1Xt+1 − Iˆ
(t)
t+1 − U
(t)
t+1 + U
(t+1)
t+1 ]
1 + rf,t
−
λtCovt[Rt+1 − Ct+1 + Pt+1Xt+1 − Iˆ
(t)
t+1 − U
(t)
t+1 + U
(t+1)
t+1 , rm,t]
1 + rf,t
=
Et[Rt+1 − Ct+1 + Pt+1min{Xt, Xt+1) + U
(t+1)
t+1 − U
(t)
t+1]
1 + rf,t
−
λtCovt[Rt+1 − Ct+1 + Pt+1min{Xt, Xt+1) + U
(t+1)
t+1 − U
(t)
t+1, rm,t]
1 + rf,t
,
where we have used the fact that Pt+1Xt+1 − Iˆ
(t)
t+1 = Pt+1min{Xt, Xt+1) in the final step. Solving
this equation for Et[Rt+1] results in equations (9) and (10). Together they describe the expected
revenue which the regulated firm should be allowed to earn if its value is always to equal the ODV
of its assets. ¥
The term in large brackets in equation (9) can be interpreted as the expected economic depre-
ciation for the hypothetical replacement firm: The first term, PtXt, is the cost of building the
efficiently-configured asset in year t; the second term, Et[Pt+1min{Xt, Xt+1}], is its expected
optimized replacement cost in the following year; the third term, Et[U
(t+1)
t+1 − U
(t)
t+1], is the ex-
pected value of its excess capacity in year t+1. Thus, we can interpret the term in large brackets
as the expected change in the ODV of the hypothetical replacement firm over the first year of
its life.
This suggests one possible interpretation of the regulation which results when ODV is
adopted as the firm’s rate base: the regulated firm is allowed to collect the same expected
revenue as a hypothetical replacement firm which is allowed to keep the value of any capacity
which is not utilized after the first year of operation.
On a more practical note, we see that incentive regulation can be achieved using ORC as
the rate base, but not if we use a naive implementation of Marshall, et al.’s approach. Instead,
allowance must be made for the possibility that some current, efficiently-configured, capacity
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becomes temporarily under-utilized in the future. The value of this future excess capacity affects
both expected economic depreciation and the allowed rate of return. This is important, since, as
we discuss in the following section, regulators do not seem to include the value of excess capacity
in ODV calculations.
4 Policy implications
4.1 Calculating ODV
Regulators in various jurisdictions have considered a rate base which they term optimized depri-
val value.16 However, their rate base has more in common with our ORC measure than ODV.
In this section we discuss the differences between ODV as it is used in practice and ODV as we
advocate it in this paper.
Current regulatory practice is to set the ODV of an asset equal to its replacement cost,
when the firm would replace the asset if it was deprived of the asset’s use, and the so-called
“economic value” of the asset otherwise. Economic value is defined to be the present value of
the profit-maximizing revenue which could be generated from the asset. Since the asset would
not be replaced if this present value is less than the asset’s replacement cost, this rule leads to
the following expression for the ODV of an individual asset:
ODV ′t = min{RCt, economic value at t}.
In our model, assets are either fully utilized or are not utilized at all, so that the economic value
term in the expression above is zero. Therefore, if Xt ≤ St, then only Xt units of capacity would
be replaced (costing PtXt), and the remaining St − Xt units of capacity have zero economic
value, implying an ODV of PtXt for the firm as a whole. In contrast, if Xt > St, then all St
units of capacity would be replaced, costing PtSt, which is the implied ODV for the firm. That
is, if the regulators’ ODV calculation is applied to the firm in our model, the result would be an
ODV of Ptmin{Xt, St}, which is just the ORC of the firm’s assets.
The key omission from regulators’ ODV calculations is any allowance for the value of excess
capacity. Our ODV equals the sum of the replacement cost of those assets which are currently
in use and the value of the excess capacity provided by those assets which are not in use. To
highlight the differences from current practice, we note that our expression for ODV equals the
replacement cost of an asset, if the asset is currently in use, and the value of the excess capacity
it provides otherwise. That is, the ODV of an individual asset is
ODV ′′t = min{RCt, value of excess capacity at t}.
Thus, the key difference is the approach to calculating economic value. Whereas current practice
is to use the present value of profit-maximizing revenue which the asset can generate, our
approach effectively adds in the present value of the investment expenditures which will be
avoided in the future because of the firm’s ownership of the asset. In other words, current
practice does not measure the true effect on the value of a firm if it was deprived of the ownership
of its assets.
4.2 The role of demand risk
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 show that as soon as the firm’s asset base is subject to optimization by
the regulator, the firm is exposed to the risk of demand shocks.17 In this section we discuss the
16Most notably, electricity transmission in New Zealand uses such a rate base (Ministry of Economic Develop-
ment, 2000). Although considered favorably by regulators in Australia, ODV was rejected in favor of an ORC
regime (Clarke, 1998; Johnstone, 2003, p. 3).
17This would not be the case if investment was reversible, for then the firm can simply sell (or redeploy) any
excess capacity following a negative demand shock — the firm is exposed to the risk of fluctuations in the capital
price, but not in the quantity of capital required.
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Table 1: The effect of demand risk on the allowed rate of return
β σǫ
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.25 0.0055 0.0079 0.0089 0.0093
0.50 0.0110 0.0134 0.0158 0.0170
0.75 0.0165 0.0186 0.0216 0.0237
Notes. The entries in the table report the risk premium resulting from the risk of demand shocks.
The return on the market portfolio is normally distributed with mean r¯m = 0.12 and standard
deviation σm = 0.2, and the growth in demand equals Xt+1/Xt − 1 = βrm,t + ǫt, where the noise
term is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σǫ. Demand shocks thus have
systematic risk of β. The riskless interest rate is rf = 0.04. The covariances required to calculate
the risk premia are each estimated using simulations with 100,000 draws.
implications of this result for the calculation of the firm’s allowed rate of return.
Because the precise level of the firm’s ODV depends on the distribution of all future levels of
demand, we are prevented from deriving simple expressions involving (Xt, Xt+1) for the firm’s
expected revenue and allowed rate of return under ODV-regulation. However, such simple
functional forms are possible in a special case of our model in which required capacity may
change from year t to year t + 1 but remains constant at its new level after year t + 1. This
means that no investment is required from year t + 2 onwards, implying that U
(t+1)
t+1 = U
(t)
t+1.
Substituting this into equation (10) shows that ODV-regulation can result if the regulated firm
is allowed to earn the rate of return
rt = rf,t + λtCovt
[
Rt+1 − Ct+1
PtXt
+
Pt+1
Pt
min
{
1,
Xt+1
Xt
}
, rm,t
]
on the ORC of its assets.
We use numerical simulations to show the significance of demand risk (both systematic and
unsystematic) on the allowed rate of return, simplifying our analysis by assuming that the
capital price is constant. For a range of parameter values, we estimate the component of the
risk premium due to demand shocks. That is, we estimate
λtCovt
[
min
{
1,
Xt+1
Xt
}
, rm,t
]
. (11)
The return on the market portfolio is normally distributed with mean r¯m = 0.12 and standard
deviation σm = 0.2, and the growth in demand equals
Xt+1
Xt
− 1 = βrm,t + ǫt, (12)
where the noise term ǫt is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σǫ.
Demand shocks thus have systematic risk of β. The riskless interest rate is rf = 0.04. The
covariances required to calculate the risk premia are each estimated using simulations with
100,000 draws, and the results of this exercise are reported in Table 1. For example, if demand
shocks have systematic risk of β = 0.5 and the unsystematic component of demand shocks has
a standard deviation of σǫ = 0.1, the appropriate risk premium is 1.34 percent.
The first point to note is that for reasonable parameter values the risk premium for demand
risk can be economically significant. Secondly, the risk premium is an increasing function of
systematic demand risk. Thirdly, if demand has positive systematic risk, then any additional
unsystematic demand risk adds to the risk premium because of the nonlinearity introduced by
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the irreversibility of investment and the requirement to supply. To illustrate this, consider the
demand growth equation (12). It includes both (i) the elements of demand correlated with rm,t
(that is, E[Xt+1/Xt−1|rm,t] = βrm,t) and (ii) the uncorrelated elements represented by ǫt. The
otherwise unsystematic elements, ǫt, enter systematic risk under regulation because they affect
the truncation point thus, using equation (10),
Covt
[
min
{
1,
Xt+1
Xt
}
, rm,t
]
= Covt[βrm,t + ǫt, rm,t|βrm,t + ǫt < 0].
This covariance is clearly a function of the unsystematic risk component of demand, ǫt, providing
β 6= 0.
In short, when installed assets are sunk and the firm is required to supply, regulatory regimes
that use ORC or ODV to set prices impart additional volatility to the firm’s cash flow. This
raises the revenue that the firm must be allowed to earn if it is to break even on new investment.
The higher revenue is to cover the expected cost of assets under-utilized in the future, as well as
the higher returns needed to compensate for the increased risk due to capital price and demand
uncertainty. In addition, the truncation of revenues implied by irreversibility means that both
systematic and unsystematic demand risk affect the reasonable allowable rate of return.
5 Concluding remarks
Our work suggests that under incentive regulation the rate base should not be optimized replace-
ment cost, but rather optimized deprival value calculated using the present value of expected
cost savings as the value placed upon excess capacity. Further, if firms are to break even on new
investments then the allowed rate of return should be sufficient to compensate for the extra risks
implied by incentive regulation. Also, where regulation requires firms to undertake irreversible
investments, systematic risk may be increased by the introduction of specific unsystematic risks
because of the truncation resulting from irreversibility and the requirement to supply. Not using
this rate base specification or allowing for these risks will incorrectly compensate the firm for
its investment and thereby adversely affect investment and dynamic efficiency.18
There are two sets of measurement issues suggested by our analysis. The first is that it is
not sufficient to draw comparator firms from the same industry where benchmark comparisons
are made in the process of setting regulatory parameters — they must also be subject to the
same regulatory environment. For example, European and U.S. firms’ rates of return under
regulation, even if drawn from the same industry, will likely be systematically different as a result
of different regulatory regimes. Our results suggest that significant differences may occur solely
from variations in regulation. The second measurement issue relates to assessing the profitability
of regulated industries.19 Those industries that are subject to rate of return regulation can be
expected to have lower ex ante and ex post rates of return than those subject to incentive
regulation. Under incentive regulation, the risks of stranding and capital price fluctuations are
borne by the firm rather than consumers; the reverse is true for rate of return regulation. This
difference between the regimes is exacerbated where regulation seeks to enhance competition
and thereby introduces further risk to the incumbent’s business.
We have not evaluated RPI-X regulation, but we note that the issues dealt with in this paper
are directly relevant to the choice of X and the starting price, and to evaluating violations of
such a regime. The factors of irreversibility, growth in demand, supply and capital prices that
are important to these investigations will enter the analysis as described in this paper in (9)
and (10), for example, if the regulated firm is to just cover the costs of its investments.
18We thus disagree with those who would set prices based on TELRIC calculations at intervals on the grounds
of dynamic efficiency.
19Fisher and McGowan (1983) point out the significant difficulties of any profitability assessment.
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Although it is a policy issue for the firm and regulators, and a topic deserving further
research, we have not investigated the decision to invest in advance of demand. Where there are
economies to be achieved by investing in asset configurations for which capacity is not expected
to be attained until some future date, such investment may be economically desirable. We
conjecture that use of the ODV rate base would allow the firm to just recover its investment if
it could include assets in our concept of ODV no matter whether the assets had been used then
stranded or were unused and installed in anticipation of demand. Assets installed in advance
would have valuation equal to the potential cost savings that they implied, leaving the firm
the cost saving as profit inducement for cost-efficient investment prior to demand; assets for
which there is no prospective use would have no future cost savings, and hence a zero ODV.
The systematic allowance of future cost savings associated with the calculated ODV is critical to
specifying the rate base that allows the expected recovery of investment, and it has a significant
speculative component that the regulator will generally want to assess. In this respect, and in
the verification of ODV more generally, these sorts of incentive regimes may require detailed
monitoring and regulator-decision-making that approach those of rate of return regulation.
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